harvest now, decrypt later
An attack strategy where an adversary records encrypted traffic today and stores it, planning to decrypt it once a large quantum computer exists.
Traffic that must stay secret for years can be recorded today and read later, and nothing can undo the recording.
In more detail
It means data with a long secrecy life, such as health records or state secrets, is already at risk even though no such quantum computer exists yet. Only the key exchange needs to be broken later to unlock the recorded session, which is why key exchange is being moved to post-quantum algorithms first, usually in a hybrid form. Signatures are less urgent, because forging one requires the quantum computer at the moment of the attack.
Related terms
- hybrid key exchange — Running a classical key exchange and a post-quantum one together and combining both results, so an attacker has to break both to learn the session key.
- ML-KEM — The NIST-standard post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism, used to agree a shared secret key in a way that a quantum computer is not known to break.
- quantum computer — A computer that uses the physics of quantum states to solve certain kinds of mathematical problems far faster than ordinary computers can.
- forward secrecy — A property of key exchange where a stolen long-term private key cannot decrypt past recorded sessions, because each session used temporary keys.
Taught in
- Post-Quantum Cryptography & Key Lifecycles — Cybersecurity Fundamentals, GRC & Cryptography